BUREAUCRACY UNDER DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT
THE
chieftain of a small primitive tribe is as a rule in a position to
concentrate in his hands alliegislative, administrative, and judiciary
power. His will is the law. He is both executive and judge.
But it is different when the despot has succeeded in expanding the size of
his realm. As he lacks ubiquity, he must delegate a part of his power to
subordinates. They are, in their districts, his deputies, acting in his name
and under his auspices. In fact they become local despots only nominally
subject to the mighty overlord who has appointed them. They rule their
provinces according to their own will, they become satraps. The great king
has the power to discharge them and to appoint a successor. But that is no
remedy either. The new governor also soon becomes an almost independent
satrap. What some critics-wrongly assert with regard to representative
democracy, namely, that the people is sovereign only on election day, is
literally true with regard to such a system of despotism; the king is
sovereign in the provinces only on the day he appoints a new governor.
In what does the position of such a provincial governor differ from that of
the manager of a business branch? The manager of the whole concern hands
over an aggregate to the newly appointed branch manager and gives him one
directive only: Make profits. This order, the observance of which is
continuously checked by the accounts, is sufficient to make the branch a
subservient part of the whole concern and to give to its manager's action
the direction aimed at by the central manager. But if the despot, for whom
his own arbitrary decision is the only principle of government, appoints
a governor and says to him: "Be my deputy in this province," he makes the
deputy's arbitrariness supreme in this province. He renounces, at least
temporarily, his own power to the benefit of the governor.
In order to avoid this outcome the king tries to limit the governor's powers
by issuing directives and instructions. Codes, decrees, and statutes tell
the governors of the provinces and their subordinates what to do if such or
such a problem arises. Their free discretion is now limited; their first
duty is now to comply with the regulations. It is true that their
arbitrariness is now restricted in so far as the regulations must be
applied. But at the same time the whole character of their management
changes. They are no longer eager to deal with each case to the best of
their abilities; they are no longer anxious to find the most appropriate
solution for every problem. Their main concern is to comply with the rules
and regulations, no matter whether they are reasonable or contrary to what
was intended. The first virtue of an administrator is to abide by the codes
and decrees. He becomes a bureaucrat.